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Abstract: This paper introduces the concepts of immunity and full spectrum threats in the context of 
business continuity and resilience planning at a UK higher education institution. It also describes the 
approach taken by the University of Northampton to build a reliable response capability through 
behavioural change at strategic and operational levels. It is hoped that the experience and processes 
presented will enable readers to complement their thinking, planning and exercising. 
 
Introduction 
This paper describes the authors’ involvement in a series of iterative processes to review current 
arrangements for a reliable business continuity and crisis management capability to address health, 
security, criminal, cyber and other scenarios. As the University planned a move to a new campus in an 
urban location from two leafy, suburban ones and also took into account national guidance from 
government and law enforcement professionals about threats to all significant organisations with 
crowded places, open campuses and student bodies, it was recognised at the highest level that 
significant enhancements to processes and preparedness were needed. 
The paper will begin by outlining some of the specific challenges faced by higher education institutions 
(colleges and universities) in the UK. It will then introduce what organisational resilience means for 
the modern, digital dependent university. The concepts of immunity and full spectrum threat are then 
introduced. The term immunity is useful as it reminds us that organisations, their people and 
processes being able to prevent and respond to risk is an emergent capability built up from active 
learning, proactive health and constant challenge. The notion of full spectrum threat is most 
commonly recognised at the moment in relation to hybrid warfare, but means that there are a wide 
range of risks (some of which may blend) that any organisation needs to anticipate and have the 
capacity to manage the consequences of. In summary, this is about developing the confidence and 
competence of teams to be agile and adaptive to a dynamic threat environment.  The final sections of 
the paper describe how the authors worked with the senior and operational management of the 
university to assess current capability and extend it in terms of breadth and depth. These processes 
embedded the above concepts and understandings, drew on some proprietary techniques and 
leveraged specialist external insight where necessary. 
The Specific Challenges of UK Higher Education Institutions 
A university or college (a Higher Education Institution or HEI) is no different to any other organisation 
in that it could easily be the target of attack in any form. Indeed, given the fundamentally open nature 
of, especially, university campuses (parkland or city-centre) and the fact that there are thousands of 
individuals studying, working and living in close proximity, to some degree they offer a very soft target 
for conventional criminal exploitation or terrorist attack. In the former case, students and staff could 
be the victims of mugging or theft, in the latter as ‘crowded places’ in UK government nomenclature 
they could be targeted for a wide range of terrorist attack methodology. A student body is also a 
customer base for those pursuing fraud, selling illegal drugs and other nefarious activities.  
Beyond these facts, the modern university is a digital university, as dependent on Internet access, data 
confidentiality, integrity and availability as any FTSE 100 business. Teaching, learning, grading, the 
efficient management of the institution and the holding of intellectual property (IP) is all enabled by 
digital systems. Without these, business continuity is immediately impacted. If compromised, 
significant investment as well as stakeholder trust and confidence are lost. The potential value of IP 
that is lost could be significant and as universities seek to diversity their income streams through spin-
offs, undertaking consultancy and contract research and so on: massive harm could be done to the 
financial viability of an HEI. 
In addition, any event that occurs at or near a college or university campus will inevitably generate 
reputational consequences. Even routine occurrences attract a quantity of scrutiny and attention 
which may be undeserved but would be impossible to prevent. The importance of detecting potential 
threats and risks generated from within the institution is therefore high. The ability to quickly spot a 
developing situation with reputational consequences and intervene effectively is critical.  
Organisational Resilience 
We understand organisational resilience to be the inherent capability of an organisation to ensure 
that it minimises incurred costs and reputational damage by maintaining the delivery of business 
critical services. There are many definitions of resilience – but the authors believe that it is critical that 
rather than just thinking about the ability to respond and recover (as the UK Cabinet Office summarises 
it), we should be relentlessly focussed on resilience being about certainty in the ability to continue to 
meet expectations of customers and others under challenging circumstances, most importantly, as 
well as being able to respond and recover when there is no choice but to accept the suspension of 
normal levels of customer service. Ideally, all eventualities would be detected or managed in a way 
which meant that customers need not be aware that there had been a need to initiate resilience 
arrangements. In addition, we believe that resilience arises from sound planning, action and corporate 
culture and not just from specific business continuity, crisis and risk management activities. 
Immunity 
The immune system is a powerful analogy. Frequently used by marketing gurus to spin the provision 
of slightly adaptive software solutions, the immune system is much more useful as a means of both 
conceptualising what’s needed to handle a wide range of threats and events and achieving buy-in with 
boards and others as a communications tool. Hills has [insert references, Vancouver style] (and is) 
exploring how the analogy can be employed in practical terms. In summary, the simple reality that an 
immune system is made up of passive and active components is incredibly useful. The skin or shell of 
an organism, for example, is a protective barrier which prevents the intrusion of pathogens and shields 
from at least some damage. As well as a physical structure, the skin has management systems which 
ensure that it is maintained in the best condition possible as well as at the correct level of acidity / 
alkalinity to make it a hostile environment for fungi or bacteria which might otherwise colonise it and 
then cause harm to it or invade were the integrity of the skin to be broken.  
These aspects of the passive immune system alone offer a rich source of ideas for how an organisation 
might protect its attack surfaces (personnel, physical, cyber, reputational, etc.) from harm and kept in 
the best condition possible and where any weakening is detected. 
The active immune system is made up of complex cells and mechanisms which recognise invading or 
home-grown (e.g. tumour cells) threats as unwanted and act instantly to engage, contain and destroy 
them. Other cells and systems identify novel threats and develop means to prevent them from 
propagating in the system. Supportive reactions are initiated to make the organism a less benign 
environment for an invader (e.g. raising the temperature through initiating a fever response) or 
signalling for the mass production of cells and attraction of helper cells.  
The parallels are immediate and obvious if we transpose how the biological organism’s immune 
system works and how we would want the corporate body to function: reactively and pro-actively. 
The vision which the University of Northampton has developed is one where security and other staff 
(and eventually all employees and students) are sensors: agents of immunity. Here, those charged 
with security, health and safety, wellbeing and related functions form a protective capability. They 
work to identify problems or potential problems in ways that embody the ethos and values of the 
organisation. The senior management team and the operational leads are responsible for setting 
expectations of others as well as in their own actions working in the interests of developing and 
maintaining immunity. 
Full Spectrum Threat 
The experience of many involved in business continuity, crisis management and other activities is one 
where both emergencies and routine disruptions create consequences where the precise cause of the 
emergency or event may not be immediately obvious and sometimes may never be understood. For 
the former case, imagine a scenario where fire alarms sound and planned and chaotic evacuations are 
unfolding from many buildings – but it transpires that the initial triggering of a fire alarm was because 
an individual feeling under threat from individuals had no other means of attracting attention. In the 
case of causations which may never be understood, mass hysteria and failure in cyber systems could 
be mentioned. Hills has worked with many orgaisations whose databases and other systems have 
failed, but because they have eventually re-started and investigation would be complex and 
expensive, no formal diagnosis takes place. Embedded risks and vulnerabilities therefore remain. 
Any organisation, HEI or otherwise, therefore has to be prepared to handle and intervene effectively 
against situations which may not be as they seem. In addition, it may be very difficult to manage such 
an eventuality because the systems needed to undertake strategic leadership and operational control 
are part of (or are) the target. In the event of the failure of communications media – how would the 
responding mult-layered team work to achieve situational awareness, make decisions, communicate 
decisions and monitor the effectiveness of those decisions. We assume that email, mobile telephony 
etc. will persist: but instead perhaps a graceful degradation to reliance on cheap handheld two-way 
radios would be sensible. And, of course, all involved would have to rehearse working in these 
conditions on a regular basis. 
The term full spectrum threats is unashamedly borrowed from cutting-edge thinking by scholars of 
military conduct. For example, Jonsson and Seely have lobbied for the West to more usefully think 
about the complex, unrestricted nature of the strategy and tactics of the Russian Federation as being 
open to all of the various ways in which power can be projected: “kinetic violence, information, 
economic and energy, and political influence operations”.i By encouraging a focus on consequences 
rather than causes we bypass the restrictions that are presented to us by being obsessed by history 
or the latest near miss or incident that has befallen an unfortunate other. If the ambition of an 
adversary is to impose costs on their targets, defence strategists need to be aware that these costs 
may be served in any domain. Similarly, planned attacks or natural disasters can challenge the 
sustainability and even survival of businesses even though, with hindsight, it is totally clear that, say, 
an embedded risk could have been surfaced and resolved or that a combination of continuity and 
emergency planners have, in the past, largely been involved in the drafting of plans for specific threats 
or eventualities. The endless generation and prioritisation of lists of potential doom-laden occurrences 
and amending of plans to make them specific to certain circumstances has been largely nugatory 
(especially when in our experience these plans are unlikely to be able to work even in the expected 
scenarios). 
By thinking of the full spectrum of threats which create a consequence (just think of the variety of 
ways in which a building and anything contained in it could be made off-limits: fire, flood, crime scene, 
collision by a vehicle, contamination, sinkholes, infestation of vermin, loss of power, incapacitation of 
control systems through cyber attack etc.) – we begin to realise that we need to invest in human 
capacity (and the technology and knowledge needed to enable it) to adapt and extend to cope with 
an unknowably large set of threats which create a more knowable but unpredictable series of 
consequences. Plans will not suffice, narrow exercises will not assure the ability to cope with and tame 
significant challenges which will no doubt co-occur with other events, develop in unusual ways and so 
on. Full spectrum threats will overlap with one another and require close collaboration and co-
ordination between experienced people, reinforced by those learning from their exposure to real 
world challenges and all supported by technological and other resources which enable decision-
makers to understand a developing, dynamic, difficult situation and intervene effectively in it.  
The University of Northampton Experience 
Understanding the need for senior management and other decision-makers to be able to manage a 
wide range of potential scenarios of a range of durations, the University of Northampton undertook a 
systematic review of its arrangements for crisis and related situations. As part of this process, the 
authors of this paper became a core team. Uniting an academic-practitioner (Hills) with an 
administrator-practitioner (Allen) turned out to be one of the most helpful ideas we could have had. 
This cocktail of talents meant that we were able to leverage Hills’ experience and research portfolio 
with the pragmatic insight and bureaucratic nous of Allen.  
Hills was able to convince Allen of the merits of adopting and adapting an approach that he had 
developed in the UK Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) and used in consultancy 
since. Scenario-Driven Exercises (SDEs), described in the open literature for the first time by Hills in 
2015,ii are a fast-to-develop, cheap and high impact way of both testing existing plans, processes and 
capabilities and designing enhancements ‘on the fly’. The authors worked together to deliver such 
exercises – once for the senior management team and another for the operational team. The first was 
to embed the concepts introduced above, the second to translate the ethos captured from the SMT 
and embed it into their plans for operational health, safety and security.  
Both events were highly collegiate, convivial and focused on outcomes which would benefit the 
organisation and those charged with supporting actions in the event of either a crisis or notification 
that a crisis may occur. We were also able to capture key learning points from participants at the SMT 
drawn from their experience at other institutions handling very challenging events and who could also 
inject caution to those that were new to such roles and responsibilities about, for example, the 
amount of actual support from stakeholders and first responders versus what they had hoped for.  
The SMT were also able to benefit from our invitation for a recently retired member of the UK special 
forces community to undertake some targeted training. The focus of this, which reinforced emerging 
lessons from the Scenario-Driven Exercise (SDE), was on the demands of performance under pressure.  
The trainer was able to work with the SMT to explain how the individual body and mind and teams 
could be prepared to cope better with the stress and uncertainty of crises by drawing on several 
models of special forces thinking. 
Work with the operational team involved being able to provide a confidential space and neutral 
facilitation to draw up an approach which would enable them to align development and investment 
with SMT requirements and also address necessary changes and long-desired outcomes that they held 
dear. Again, there was substantial value added to the work of colleagues as benefit was provided by 
trusted and approachable individuals motivated by an aspiration to ensure that inherent human 
capability at all levels was enhanced for the move to the new campus in a time where, regionally and 
nationally, the threat posed by conventional criminality and terrorism is growing.  
Associated work also drew on the specialist insights of law enforcement and other personnel – some 
on the staff of the university, some part of our extended network of friends, some specially 
commissioned – to ensure that the university’s plans knitted into and were cognisant of the response 
plans of the emergency services and others. Beyond that, the authors were able to bid for Home Office 
funding essentially to extend the line of attack in this project at the sector-wide organisation level in 
the Higher Education Institution space, leading to an extension of value from the University to the 
colleges and universities nationwide. 
Conclusion 
This paper has described an extensive, but rapid, approach taken by the University of Northampton 
to increase its immunity to a full spectrum of threats which the authors led. The overall ambition of 
the work undertaken by the University was to achieve what the former head of the US Cyber 
Command described as a high-reliability organisation which relentlessly seeks to reduce exposure to 
risk and simultaneously increase capacity to stretch to deliver core business despite threats 
materialising. As he put it, to achieve this, one has to realise more than just technology is needed: “It’s 
about ethos. It’s about culture. [It’s about] how you man, train, and equip your organization, how you 
structure it, the operational concepts that you apply.” 
This paper has detailed the ethos of the institution, the recognition of the need for behavioural 
(culture) change and the implications for the selection of individuals to undertake certain roles, an 
example of training undertaken and hinted at the ways in which investments in equipment have been 
underpinned by insights gained from the work of the authors. It is hoped that a short insight into the 
concepts which have driven our approach will inspire readers to extend and replace these with their 
own. Finally, we are delighted to work with others in developing these ideas and welcome 
correspondence. 
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